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holder and the corporation' and it can be said that the shareholder has
consented in advance to representation by the corporation in matters of
appraisal.'
By this decision the uncertainty which confronted lawyers repre-
senting either corporate clients or dissenting shareholders as a result of
the Ohio decision has been dispelled. It is dear now that the corporation
must take some action when dissenting shareholders set a valuation upon
their shares, or be bound to pay the amount demanded. If the corpora-
tion makes a counter offer and neither side asks for any appraisal the
conclusive presumption in favor of such counter offer would likewise
satisfy the requirements of due process and the majority shareholders
would be bound thereby, as would the dissenters. The effect upon the
rights of the majority would be the same if the corporation agreed to
pay the price set by the dissenters.
If a majority shareholder has actual notice of the demands of the
dissenters and learns that the corporation is doing nothing to comply
with the statute, he had better take steps to persuade the directors to
act. If upon demand by the majority shareholder the board refuses to
do anything to protect the interests of the corporation, the shareholder
may bring suit to compel the board to comply with the statute or may
himself, in a represenative action, ask for an appraisal.? It is not
necessary for him to show present injury if he can show threatened
irreparable injury."0  J.M.B.
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAw - LOTTERIES - BANK NIGHT.
Plaintiff, owner of a motion picture theatre, attempted to enjoin
interference by the police with a scheme whereby every adult member of
the community was invited to register his or her name in a book in the
theatre lobby, such registration being free of charge and not dependent
upon prior purchase of tickets to the theatre. Such registrants were given
a number which they were to hold, making them eligible to participate
'Wegner v. Wegner, sot Ohio St. z2, zz6 N.E. 89z (z9zo). Under the reserved
power of the state, conferred by Ohio Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 2, the shareholder is
bound by the pertinent statutes passed after he becomes a shareholder.
Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes (1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 1165.
' Such right is a derivative one and the suit should be brought by the shareholder on
behalf of the corporation.
"ODodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, iS L. Ed. 401 (zS6) 5 Zinn v. Baxter, 6S Ohio
St. 34r, 6z N. E. 327 (19o); 13 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. (PERm. ED.) sec. 5939. But
compare Zimmerman, J., who thought contra in the Voeller case, 136 Ohio St. at 433
26 N.E. (2d) at 446.
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in a weekly drawing for a sum of money, given to the person who held
the number drawn from a wheel. It was not necessary that the person
be present in the theatre to win, it being sufficient to be outside the
theatre, in which case he might enter free, within a specified number of
minutes, to claim his prize. Held: Injunction refused. The plan includes
the elements of, and constitutes, a lottery, a scheme of chance within the
scope of and forbidden by Ohio General Code, section 13o63 et seq.1
The definition of a lottery, which seems to be consistent with the
numerically superior decisions, and in accord with the instant case,
states: Where a prize is to be given upon the happening of a contingency
to be determined by chance, to one who has paid a valuable consideration
for the opportunity to participate in the result, a lottery is constituted.'
The elements of chance and prize are easily found in the bank night
situations. It is on the question of consideration that a major split of
authority has been based. One line of authority holds that the considera-
tion which passes from the donee of the chance to the donor of the chance
must be intrinsically valuable, given in addition to whatever normally
would pass from those of which class the donee is a member, to those
of which class the donor is a member.' This requirement is not insisted
upon by some courts, which hold that part of the admission price is paid
for a better chance of winning a prize; 4 or that prizes were paid from
admission money; 5 or that inferior pictures were shown on bank nights;'
or that a controlling inducement of purchasing a ticket is the lure of the
prize." Consistent with this view, some courts hold that where there is
no necessity of the purchase of a ticket as a condition precedent to regis-
tration and subsequent possibility of acquiring a prize, there is no addi-
tional element present, which will constitute consideration, hence no
lottery.8 This argument has been denied by courts, where it was found
that there was difficulty involved in registering without having purchased
a ticket.?
'Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 64 Ohio App. soS, 28 N.E. (2d) 207 (5940).
2BRILL, CYCLOPEDIA CRIMINAL LAw, sec. 1o; 17 R.C.L. =22i Robb and Rowley
Inc. et al. v. State, 131 Tex. 188, IZ7 S.,. (zd) zza (1939); Darlington Theatres Inc.
v. Coker Sheriff et al., 19o S.C. 282, z S.E. (2d) 782 (5939); St. Peter v. Pioneer Thea-
tre Corp., 227 Iowa 1391, 291 N.W. 164. (1940); State v. Devroux, 54 Ohio Op. 283
(5939).
aState v. Big Chief Corp., - R.I. -, 13 A. (zd) 236 (1940); St. Peter v. Pioneer
Theatre Corp., 227 Iowa 1391, 291 N.W. 564 (1940).
'Commonwealth v. Heffner, 300 Mass. -, 24 N.E. (zd) 5o8 (939); Iris Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. zS6, 8 N.E. (2d) 648 (1937).
'State ex rel. Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp., Iio Mont. -, 5ox P. (2d)
xo65 0940).
'Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz, Is F. Supp. 566 (1935)-
' Kent v. City of Chicago et al-, 301 Ill. App. 312, 22 N.E. (zd) 799 (1g9).
'State of Iowa v. G. P. Hundling, z2o Iowa 1369, z64 N.W. 688 (1936); Park
Theatre Corp. v. Mook, 87 P.L.J. 5o (1939).
'Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 5z9 Tex. 40, 100 S.W. (zd) 695 (1936); People
v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 2 N.E. (zd) 38 (1936).
It is thus seen that there is an important difference of opinion based
upon the interpretation of what constitutes intrinsically valuable con-
sideration, while admitting in effect that there must be such element
before a lottery situation is created. But the second line of authority,
which is representative of the instant case, holds that there need not be
any intrinsically valuable consideration passing from the donee of the
chance to the donor of the chance, but rather, any valuable consideration.
Under this interpretation, the question in regard to consideration would
not be, has the donee done anything he was not legally bound to do or
parted with a right, the detriment aspect, but rather has the donor of the
chance received anything of value for which he has bargained, the benefit
aspect. Thus it has been held, in accord with the present case, that the
increased patronage derived from bank night schemes, or the advertising
values attained therefrom, or because there is a tendency to buy a ticket
when one registers or when the chances are drawn, or a combination of
the factors, constitutes consideration for the scheme, so as to establish
a lottery."0
Lottery statutes were passed for the purpose of avoiding the vicious
effects upon those other than the promoter, which effects result both from
the wasting of money and from the gambling spirit. This in effect
would seem to be for the purpose of preventing false economic evalua-
tions by those upon whose practical evaluations, the sustenance of whole
families often depends." Thus, when the question before a court is:
"Vill the combination of a particular set of facts be deemed a lottery?"
it would seem better policy to decide the question of consideration as does
the case at hand so that the purpose of the statutes could more easily be
carried out, and hold that increased patronage and advertising are
sufficient consideration to fulfill the lottery requirement.
R. R. R.
"'Robb & Rowley United Inc. ct al. v. State, 131 Tex. iSS, 1z7 S.V. (zd) zzx
(1939); Affiliated Enterprise v. Waller, 5 A. (ad) 257 (939); McFadden v. Bain, 16z
Ore. 2o, 91 P. (2d) 29Z (1939)i contra, Park Theatre Corp. v. Mook, 87 P.L.J. lot('939).9 Harriman Institute of Social Research v. Carrie Tingly Crippled Children's Hos-
pital, 43 N.M. 1, 8. P. (zd) IOSS (1939); St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227 Iowa
1391, 294 NAV. 164 (.940).
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